The global geopolitics The global geopolitics of the 21st century is bound to be shaped by “The Epic Confrontation”, an Iran-USA conflict built up by centuries of history in each nation and their broader regions leading to a showdown.
Eras of the American Military Tradition
The American military tradition can be divided into eras based on what the USA’s grand strategy is.
1. “Whatever It Takes” (1775-1898)
2. “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick” (1898-1917, 1920-1941)
3. “Total War” (1917-1919, 1941-1945)
4. The Intermediary Phase (1945-1949)
5. “Bluff” (1949-2016)
6. A Revival for “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick” (2017-2021)
1. “Whatever It Takes” (1775-1898)
The USA in its earliest years had a rhetorical tendency of anti-militarism that even questioned the righteousness of having a standing army. In practice, strong ambitions to win and later tighten control of the land between the Atlantic and the Pacific made the USA’s military policy very different.
Still pervasive anti-militarism meant that grand strategy was oriented towards “whatever it takes” during wartime rather than a constant grand strategy that was ongoing during both war and peace.
2. “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick” (1898-1917, 1920-1941)
With the Spanish-American War in 1898, the limit to potential wars the USA could fight was ended. The USA could fight anywhere, anytime. This strategic realignment was first addressed by President Roosevelt’s “Speak softly and carry a big stick”. The USA would adopt a friendly diplomatic posture and retain a powerful military at its disposal. This would motivate to the maximum extent possible the cooperation of foreign nations with the USA.
3. “Total War” (1917-1919, 1941-1945)
As the United States Government achieved friendship with some nations more than others, the next step was one the Founding Fathers cautioned against (“entangling alliances”), a policy of building alliances with favored nations and fighting their wars for them.
This involved the USA in the two World Wars. These were also “total wars” as:
I. The Government exercised a totalitarian degree of authority for the sake of the war effort.
II. The Government integrated the civilian workforce to the extent possible into the military-industrial complex.
III. The Laws of War were aggressively violated so long as strategic aims could be achieved.
IV. Surrender had to be unconditional, leading to regime change.
V. The enemy nation, enemy government and especially their top leader was to be demonized highly, even relatively to previous wars, to justify the first four features of total war.
4. The Intermediary Phase (1945-1949)
1945-1946 witnessed the most massive demobilization of the US Armed Forces ever. By the end of 1946, Stalinist policy provoked concerns that another wars would be needed to secure the land the US had so recently liberated.
In 1948, Stalin’s blockade of Berlin and obstruction of all-Korean elections clarified that the concerns were valid—the Cold War was on. Then the emergence of the Soviet nuclear bomb in 1949 would establish the background for the USA’s grand strategy for the Cold War.
5. “Bluff” (1949-2016)
a. Cold War (1949-1989)
The dynamics of MAD precluded a third total war against hardened targets, necessitating that an element of “bluff” was always crucial to grand strategy. Proxy or secondary wars against targets of opportunity were however both a very real source of risk and violence while still absolutely necessary for giving credibility to the bluff used for handling hardened targets.
The Korea (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1956-1973) Wars ended with American policymakers revising their definition of targets of opportunity. Non-nuclear powers could also be hardened targets. A sort of “Vietnam Syndrome” affected American policy and society for the rest of the Cold War.
b. An Emerging Enthusiasm for War (1989-2001)
With the collapse of the USSR, the USA could have reverted to earlier grand strategies but its commitment to the “international community” was too strong. Instead US antagonism to Iraqi expansionism made the next target of opportunity clear. Realizing that military occupation was a weakness but firepower a strength, the US Armed Forces stopped short of overthrowing the Iraqi Government. The incredible ease of defeating the Iraqi Government made many American policymakers doubt the wisdom of such mercy. This Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) was fought by the USA under the first President Bush (1989-1993). He would be followed by President Clinton (1993-2001) under whom various small wars allowed the United States Armed Forces to test new strategies and tactics against targets of opportunity.
c. Escalating War—the War on Terror (2001-2011)
The drama and trauma of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack allowed for an escalation of strikes on targets of opportunity. The invasion of Afghanistan (2001) was followed by the invasion of Iraq (2003)—it seemed as if the Vietnam Syndrome had been overcome. Two problems arose.
To the extent that Iraq allied with jihadi terrorists, it was nowhere near the extent of support by the Gulf States and Pakistan, official allies of the USA. That and obvious exaggeration regarding a WMD threat soured support for the Iraq War quickly.
Secondly the longer time went on without a repeat of 9-11, the more Americans saw a repeat as unlikely and this soured support for the War in Afghanistan, especially after Osama bin Laden, the face of the terrorist threat, was killed in Pakistan, officially an ally of America in the War on Terror.
d. Retreat to Air and Special Forces (2011-2016)
With the retreat of the USA from Iraq in 2011, military occupation was over except in Afghanistan. Even the US return to Iraq, provoked by the emergence of ISIS in 2014, would be an affair of air and Special Forces rather than a massive land army. This new approach to striking targets of opportunity allowed for two wars under Bush to become seven under Obama.
As the US Armed Forces under Obama adapted towards the requirements of fighting from a safe distance, the diplomatic corps did likewise by seeking to prolong wars by balancing powers so that none would win. This additional weapon in the arsenal for striking targets of opportunity had its biggest example in the Syrian War (2011- ) where the USA gave patronage to a Muslim Brotherhood rebellion against President Bashar Assad where negotiating a deal on nuclear arms in 2015 that strengthened Assad’s patron, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While this innovation in expressing American might against targets of opportunity added to America’s offensive arsenal, it did no favors in renewing support for the War on Terror. In the Presidential Election of 2016, Obama’s Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, lost to Donald Trump.
6. A Revival for “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick” (2017-2021)
Donald Trump has been characterized as an isolationist and yet “isolationism” itself was not peaceful so much as a characterization by the advocates of total war in the lead-up to World War II of the relatively less militant “Speak softly and carry a big stick” approach to US grand strategy then prevalent.
This strategic summary by President Theodore Roosevelt was not brought up as much as it should have been during Trump’s Presidency because Trump’s version allowed for two exceptions to “Speak softly”.
The first exception was if the President needed a distraction. Aggressive rhetoric towards “Rocket Man” Kim distracted from Trump’s lack of enthusiasm for a fight; likewise with “animal Assad”. This compensated for when the more usual demeanor of friendship was not feasible.
The second exception was when nations presented as US allies. Then shame was used so that the other clause of “carry a big stick” would be supported to the maximum extent by the supposed allies.
This isolationist approach of the Trump Administration was ended by the Biden Administration (2021- ) whose boast is that the US is “back in the world”. This is PR for continuity in personnel and policy from the Obama Administration.
Thus the historical background of the Epic Confrontation has come to pass. What may the future hold?